EPSTEIN
page 7 / 1261 . OCR, unverified
amended § 3283 to provide: “No statute of limitations that would
otherwise preclude prosecution for an offense involving the sexual or
physical abuse, or kidnaping, of a child under the age of 18 years shall
preclude such prosecution during the life of the child.”*° The text of
§ 3283—that no statute of limitations that would otherwise preclude
prosecution of these offenses will apply—plainly requires that it
prevent the application of any statute of limitations that would
otherwise apply to past conduct.
The statutory text makes clear that Congress intended to extend
the time to bring charges of sexual abuse for pre-enactment conduct as
the prior statute of limitations was inadequate. This is enough to
conclude that the PROTECT Act’s amendment to § 3283 applies to
Maxwell’s conduct as charged in the Indictment.
24 In re Enter. Mortg. Acceptance Co., LLC, Sec. Litig., 391 F.3d 401, 406 (2d Cir. 2004) (citing
Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 280).
2 Weingarten, 865 F.3d at 55 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
26 PROTECT Act, Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 202, 117 Stat. 650, 660 (2003).
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3. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Denying
Maxwell’s Motion for a New Trial
Maxwell contends that she was deprived of her constitutional right
to a fair and impartial jury because Juror 50 failed to accurately
respond to several questions related to his history of sexual abuse as
part of the jury questionnaire during jury selection. Following a special
evidentiary hearing, the District Court denied Maxwell’s motion for a
new trial.
We review a District Court’s denial of a motion for a new trial for
abuse of discretion.”” We have been extremely reluctant to “haul jurors
in after they have reached a verdict in order to probe for potential
instances of bias, misconduct or extraneous influences.” 28 While courts
can “vacate any judgment and grant a new trial if the interest of justice
so requires,” Fed. R. Crim. P. 33(a), they should do so “sparingly” and
only in “the most extraordinary circumstances.” A district court “has
2 See Rivas v. Brattesani, 94 F.3d 802, 807 (2d Cir. 1996). “[W]e are mindful that a judge has
not abused her discretion simply because she has made a different decision than we would
have made in the first instance.” United States v. Ferguson, 246 F.3d 129, 133 (2d Cir. 2001).
We have repeatedly explained that the term of art “abuse of discretion” includes errors of
law, a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence, or “a decision that cannot be located
within the range of permissible decisions.” In re Sims, 534 F.3d 117, 132 (2d Cir. 2008)
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
28 United States v. Moon, 718 F.2d 1210, 1234 (2d Cir. 1983).
2 Ferguson, 246 F.3d at 134.
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broad discretion to decide Rule 33 motions based upon its evaluation
of the proof produced” and is shown deference on appeal.”
A Rule 33 motion based on a juror’s alleged erroneous response
during voir dire is governed by McDonough Power Equipment, Inc. v.
Greenwood.*! Under McDonough, a party seeking a new trial “must first
demonstrate that a juror failed to answer honestly a material question
on voir dire, and then further show that a correct response would have
provided a valid basis for a challenge for cause.” *
The District Court applied the McDonough standard, found Juror
50’s testimony credible, and determined that Juror 50’s erroneous
responses during voir dire were “not deliberately incorrect” and that
“he would not have been struck for cause if he had provided accurate
responses to the questionnaire.”* In fact, as the District Court noted,
Maxwell did not challenge the inclusion of other jurors who disclosed
past experience with sexual abuse, assault, or harassment. This is
3° United States v. Gambino, 59 F.3d 353, 364 (2d Cir. 1995) (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted).
31 464 U.S. 548 (1984).
32 Td. at 556.
38 A-340 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court reminds us that “[t]o invalidate the result
of a[ ] trial because of a juror’s mistaken, though honest response to a question, is to insist
on something closer to perfection than our judicial system can be expected to give.”
McDonough, 464 U.S. at 555.